The Tax They Pay May Be Your Own: Promotion, Taxes and Labour Supply
建立了一个劳动供给模型，其中增加努力会提高晋升概率，并发现研究工资和税收对工作激励的影响时，其他工人（尤其是已晋升的年长工人）的税后收入有时至关重要。
A model of labor supply is formulated in which increased effort results in an increase in the probability of promotion. A simple benchmark model is extended in two directions. The first emphasizes the link between labor supply and saving decisions. The other takes account of the interaction between workers via contests for promotion. A general insight the emerges from the analysis is that when studying the effects of wages and taxes on incentives to work, it is sometimes the after-tax incomes of other workers--in particular senior workers who have already been promoted--that are of crucial importance. Copyright 1994 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.