Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts
研究采购拍卖中单价合同（UPC）的投标行为，发现最优投标通常非单调，可能导致低效分配，但相比第一价格拍卖，UPC拍卖通过补贴低类型投标人增强竞争，减少信息租金，从而可能对买方更有利。
In competitive procurement auctions, bids often have the form of unit-price contracts (UPCs). We show that optimal bidding behavior in UPC auctions is typically non-monotonic, and therefore may lead to inefficient allocations. However, UPC auctions may still be desirable for the buyer when compared to efficient mechanisms such as the first-price auction. In a UPC auction, low types are subsidized, and the resulting stronger competition reduces the winning bidder's informational rent, which overcompensates the efficiency loss.