The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use
用演化博弈模型分析公共可再生资源的开采问题，发现基于约束和惩罚的合作行为能抵御自私行为的入侵，并探讨价格、技术和社会凝聚力变化对开采行为及长期资源存量的影响。
The problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework. It is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well-defined sense against invasion by narrowly self-interested behavior. The resource-stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary-game dynamics. Effects of changes in prices, technology, and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long-run stock are analyzed. When threshold values of the parameters are crossed, social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long-run stock and possibly to its extinction. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.