Asymmetric Information, Nonadditive Expected Utility, and the Information Revealed by Prices: An Example
构建了一个简单模型，其中代理人拥有非对称信息且偏好由非可加期望效用函数表示。事前不知情的代理人在观察均衡价格后，其条件信念仍保持非可加性。因此，即使价格函数完全揭示信息，如果代理人对私人信息比价格系统揭示的信息更有信心，他仍可能购买“冗余”的私人信息。
I develop a simple example of a model in which agents have asymmetric information, and preferences that are represented by a nonadditive expected utility function. The a priori uninformed agent, after observing the equilibrium price, has conditional beliefs that remain nonadditive. Then, even when the equilibrium price function is fully revealing (i.e., one-to-one), it may be worth-while for an a priori uninformed agent to buy `redundant' private information if he is more confident in that information than in that revealed by the price system.