Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion
研究在央行拥有私人信息时，如何通过政策行动向公众传递信号来管理信念，并推导出最优时间一致政策，发现对产出目标的不完全信息可降低政策损失。
In models of monetary policy, discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs. However, when a policymaker possesses private information, policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies. This article derives the optimal time‐consistent policy for a general linear‐quadratic setting. The optimal policy is illustrated in a simple New Keynesian model, where analytical solutions can be derived as well. In this model, imperfect information about the policymaker's output target leads to lower policy losses.