Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities
研究如何设计激励方案，促使受监管的公用事业公司同时提供基本服务（如供电、本地电话）和服务提升（如节能服务、语音清晰度改进），发现最优方案因监管者掌握的信息不同而差异很大，基本服务价格可能被有意定在边际成本之上或之下以更好地激励服务提升，并与当前促进节能的政策方案进行了比较。
We examine the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service (e.g., electricity supply, local telephone service) and service enhancements (e.g., energy-conservation services, improved clarity and speed of voice communication). The optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly, depending upon the information available to the regulator. The price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement. Our policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation.