Controlling the Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts
研究1980年代流行的管理层收购中的利益冲突问题，分析184起案例发现：管理层面临外部竞购时原股东回报更高；竞争引发的出价调整大于诉讼和董事会谈判；管理层持股比例越低，竞争越可能发生。
A controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages. This study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings. First, returns to pre-buyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers. Second, bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards. Third, the incidence of competition is negatively related to the pre-buyout share holdings of managers.