Expecting the Unexpected: Emissions Uncertainty and Environmental Market Design
研究了加州温室气体总量控制与交易市场在启动前的潜在均衡，发现常规排放和非市场政策减排存在巨大事前不确定性，远大于价格激励可能带来的减排量，导致市场价格很可能由行政价格上下限决定。
We study potential equilibria in California’s cap-and-trade market for greenhouse gases (GHGs) based on information available before the market started. We find large ex ante uncertainty in business-as-usual emissions and in the abatement that might result from non-market policies, much larger than the reduction that could plausibly occur in response to an allowance price within a politically acceptable range. This implies that the market price is very likely to be determined by an administrative price floor or ceiling. Similar factors seem likely to be present in other cap-and-trade markets for GHGs.