CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder‐bargaining perspective
构建分析框架，研究CEO薪酬如何受企业租金创造能力、资源优势不确定性及利益相关者与高管竞争互动的影响，并预测CEO薪酬与企业增长、风险、利益相关者管理及CEO过度自信等行为偏好的因果关系。
Abstract This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility‐maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market‐based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.