Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions
利用奥地利雇主提供的退休福利规则中的不连续性，采用分组方法估计了退休激励对劳动力参与决策的半弹性，发现延迟退休6至9个月的激励效果最强。
This paper presents new evidence on the effects of retirement benefits on labor force participation decisions. The analysis is based on a mandated rule for employer-provided retirement benefits in Austria that creates discontinuities in the incentives for workers to delay retirement. The paper presents graphical evidence on labor supply responses and develops a conceptual framework that accounts for the dynamic incentive structure and for adjustment frictions. Using bunching methods, a semi-elasticity of participation is estimated, which ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 and is highest for incentives targeted at a delay in retirement by 6 to 9 months.