Designing electricity auctions
比较了统一价格和歧视性价格两种电力拍卖方式，发现统一拍卖平均价格更高，但生产效率排名不确定，并分析了竞价步数、报价时长和需求弹性等设计特征的影响。
Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids, and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats .