Collusion via Resale
证明，当拍卖后允许竞拍者之间转售时，英式拍卖容易产生隐性合谋：一个竞拍者可能无竞争地赢得拍卖，再通过转售分赃，且这种均衡优于标准价值竞价均衡。
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction interbidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto-dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or postbidding spoil division. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.