Class relations in an ‘Asiatic’ regime
构建了一个包含国家税收、逃税、工资基金和农民储蓄倾向的帕西内蒂型积累模型，分析莫卧儿印度（1550-1750）国家、农民和柴明达尔之间的经济与政治关系，揭示税收、逃税、军事或奢侈支出及生产性投资如何影响阶级利益冲突与和谐。
This paper develops a theoretical analysis of the economic and political relationships among the state, the peasantry and zamindars in Mughal India (1550-1750). The analysi s rests on a Pasinetti-type accumulation model which also incorporate s state taxation, tax evasion, a wages fund, and a variable peasant s aving propensity. It is shown that zamindar incomes and the economic dependence of peasants are related to the extent of state taxation an d of evasion. Potential sources of systematic change are identified b y highlighting both conflict and harmony of class interests arising f rom taxation, evasion, military or luxury expenditures, and productiv e investments. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.