When do Experts Cheat and Whom do They Target
提出两种专家作弊的新理论，认为顾客的可识别异质性会导致专家选择性欺诈，例如针对高估值或高成本顾客，并可能损害信息传递、降低服务质量。
A credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer. This information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed. I propose two new theories of expert cheating, suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers. According to these theories, cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination, and experts cheat selectively. For instance, experts target high-valuation and high-cost customers. Finally, selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services.