Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
研究了纽约市高中分配系统中单次抽签与多次抽签两种方法的等价性，证明在学生偏好严格且学校无差异时两者等价，并引入两种新机制。
This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in \nassigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school \nstudent assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that \na single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating \nstudents to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are \nindi fferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifi es and \nuni es all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the \nway, two new mechanisms|Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random \nEndowment|are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms \ngeneralize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be \nappropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.