Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
构建了一个强调道德风险和财务约束双重作用的分成制理论，利用突尼斯El Oulja地区的原始财务数据检验了该理论，发现佃农产出份额越低效率越低，且财务约束影响契约选择及努力水平。
This paper develops a theory of sharecropping which emphasizes the dual role of moral hazard in the provision of effort and financial constraints. The model is compatible with a large variety of contracts as observed in the region of El Oulja in Tunisia. Using an original data set including financial data, various tests of the theory are undertaken. Production functions stressing the role of effort are estimated. The data support the theory which predicts lower efficiency when the tenant's share of output is lower. The role of financial constraints in explaining which type of contract is selected (as well as the implications that financial constraints have upon effort and therefore output) are supported by the data.