Asset Write‐offs in Private Firms – The Case of German SMEs
研究发现，德国私营中小企业更可能在盈利高、金融债务多或支付股利时进行资产减记，且减记金额更大，这与会计准则预期相反，但符合高账面税收一致性的经济环境。
Abstract This paper finds that private firms make the decision to write off, and write off more in terms of total amount, if they are: (i) more profitable, (ii) have more financial debt, and (iii) pay dividends. Our findings are contrary to expectations based on accounting standards and the existing revaluation literature. They are, however, consistent with the codified, high book‐tax alignment economic setting in which sample private firms operate. This includes agency problems faced by private firms’ stakeholders. We use a comprehensive sample of German SMEs reporting in local GAAP, based on the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch) in 2003–2006. We view write‐offs as corrections of departures of book values from their underlying economic values, in contrast to upward asset revaluations. This governs our choice of estimation – the tobit regression.