Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch Auctions and Centipede Games
实验研究了蜈蚣博弈和荷兰式拍卖在不同制度格式和动态结构下的表现，发现时钟格式的蜈蚣博弈如理论预测般瓦解，而树格式的荷兰式拍卖出价接近风险中性纳什均衡，为统一建模提供了新事实。
We report an experiment on effects of varying institutional format and dynamic structure of centipede games and Dutch auctions. Centipede games with a clock format unravel, as predicted by theory but not reported in previous literature on two-player tree-format centipede games. Dutch auctions with a tree format produce bids close to risk neutral Nash equilibrium bids, unlike previous literature on clock-format Dutch auctions. Our data provide a new, expanded set of stylized facts which may provide a foundation for unified modeling of play in a class of games that includes centipede games and Dutch auctions.