Expropriation and Inventions: Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights
分析财务薄弱的独立发明人在出售易模仿且无产权的发明时，通过先披露再谈判的方式，即使面临征用风险，仍能获得可观的市场价值份额。
The authors analyze the problem faced by a financially weak independent inventor when selling a valuable, but easily imitated, invention for which no property rights exist. The inventor can protect his or her intellectual property by negotiating a contingent contract (with a buyer) prior to revealing the invention or, alternatively, the inventor can reveal the invention and then negotiate with the newly informed buyer. Despite the risk of expropriation, the authors find that, in equilibrium, an inventor with little wealth can expect to appropriate a sizable share of the market value of the invention by adopting the latter approach. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.