A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS
研究了建筑采购拍卖中企业的重复进入与投标决策，发现专注于同类合同可降低一半进入成本，拍卖人通过序列授予同类合同可降低采购成本7%。
This article studies repeated entry and bidding decisions in construction procurement auctions. I find evidence in the data that suggests the presence of significant cost savings from entering contracts of the same type. I estimate a dynamic auction model to measure the gains to experience for bidders. I allow for endogenous entry, synergies in entry, and unobserved auction heterogeneity. I find that a bidder can halve entry costs by focusing on specific contract types. An auctioneer can increase competition by awarding contracts of the same type in sequence. As a result, procurement costs for each contract can be lowered by 7%, a saving of $110,000.