A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed
描述了一个简单的两阶段补偿机制，能在涉及外部性的经济环境中实现有效配置，适用于公共品提供等多种外部性问题，要求代理人了解自身对他人的损益大小，但对遵循简单试错过程的幼稚代理人同样有效。
I describe a simple two-stage mechanism, the compensation mechanism, that implements efficient allocations in economic environments involving externalities. The compensation mechanism can be used to solve a wide variety of externalities problems, including the standard problem of public goods provision. It requires that that the agents know the magnitudes of the benefits and costs that they impose on other agents, but will also work with naive agents who follow a simple tatonnement.