Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis
研究代议制民主中政策选择的效率，通过扩展公民候选人模型到动态环境，发现均衡政策在特定意义上是有效的，但与标准经济效率标准存在差异，这些差异可视为“政治失灵”。
This paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies. It extends the citizen-candidate model of democratic policy-making to a dynamic environment. Equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period, conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process, there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens. However, policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium. The paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as "politicalfailures."