Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima
为求解多期（含无限期）、连续代理人、努力不可观测的经济模型提供了详细的理论推导和计算方法，展示了消费和劳动在截面和时间上的变异性，并探讨了保险与激励的最优权衡。
This paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi-period (including infinite-period), continuum-agent, unobservedeffort economy. Actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross-sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time. The optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full-information economy and various restricted-contracting regimes.