When Do Outsider CEOs Generate Strategic Change? The Enabling Role of Corporate Stability
研究挑战了外部CEO必然促进战略变革的假设，提出企业稳定性（常规继任、前任CEO任期长、业绩好）才是外部CEO实现更大战略变革的关键条件，基于美国航空和化工行业1972-2010年数据验证。
Abstract When academic researchers, business commentators, and boards of directors have debated the merits of hiring new CEOs from outside the firm, the implicit or explicit assumption typically made is that outsider CEOs will provide an advantage in achieving strategic change. In this study, we challenge this assumption by employing a duality perspective on stability/change, and we provide an original conceptual framework to posit that it is the presence of corporate stability (ordinary succession, a long‐tenured predecessor CEO , and good firm performance) that allows outsider CEOs to generate a greater degree of post‐succession strategic change. We use extensive longitudinal data from US airline and chemical industries between 1972 and 2010 to test our hypotheses, and we discuss how our supportive findings challenge long‐standing assumptions regarding the outsider succession–strategic change relationship, and we advocate embracing the non‐intiutive notion that stable (unstable) conditions can be enablers (barriers) of strategic change for outsider CEOs .