Devaluation Expectations and Speculative Attacks on the Currency
研究了投资者不知道央行放弃固定汇率的外汇储备阈值时，国际收支危机如何发生。风险中性或厌恶的投资者在阈值随机或固定但未知时，分别导致持续较长时间的投机性资本外流或突然的货币攻击。
In this paper balance-of-payments crises are studied in a framework in which investors do not know the threshol~ level of foreign reserves, the attainment of which implies that the central bank abandons its fixed exchange target. Investors are alternatively risk neutral or risk averters. It is shown that, depending on whether the threshold level is stochastic or fixed but unknown to investors, currency speculation reveals itself as, respectively, a speculative outflow distributed over a longer time period or a sudden speculative attack on the currency.