The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution
研究两期世代交叠模型中的政治经济均衡，发现存在一个“政治可行”的公共债务区间，在此区间内债务无需承诺即可全额偿还，且第一代可通过发行债务将收入从第二代转移给自己，并比较了债务与社会保障作为再分配工具的差异。
This paper studies the political-economic equilibrium of a two-period model with overlapping generations. In each period, the policy is chosen under majority rule by the generations currently alive. The paper identifies a "politically viable" set of values for public debt. Any amount of debt within this set is fully repaid in equilibrium, even without commitments. By issuing debt within this set, the first generation redistributes revenue in its favor and away from the second generation. The paper characterizes the determinants of the equilibrium intergenerational redistribution and identifies a difference between debt and social security as instruments of redistribution. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.