NON‐COOPERATIVE ENTRY DETERRENCE IN LICENSE AUCTIONS: DYNAMIC VERSUS SEALED BID*
研究了在许可证拍卖中，潜在进入者如何影响在位者的投标行为，比较了动态拍卖和密封投标拍卖两种形式，发现动态拍卖更有利于在位者协调阻止进入，而密封投标拍卖可能带来更高的进入概率和更有效的资源配置。
We examine the impact of potential entry on incumbent bidding behavior in license auctions, in both dynamic and sealed bid formats. Unlike sealed bid auctions, dynamic auctions reveal information about the identities of potential winners and allow bidders to revise their bids. This helps incumbents to coordinate their entry deterrence efforts. If entry is sufficiently costly for each incumbent, only the dynamic auction has an equilibrium where entry is deterred for sure. Numerical calculations suggest that, regardless of how costly entry is for each incumbent, sealed bid auctions can generate a higher probability of entry as well as a more efficient allocation.