油田单元化:不完全信息下的契约失败

Oil field unitization: contractual failure in the presence of imperfect information

American Economic Review · 1985
被引 199
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

实证分析交易成本对契约的影响,以美国原油企业未能通过油田单元化减少租金耗散为例,说明不完全信息严重限制了私人契约的有效性。

Abstract

An empirical analysis of the impact of transaction costs on contracting shows that imperfect in formation can seriously limit the effectiveness of private contracting. The case under study is the widespread failure of private crude oil producing firms to use US oil fields to reduce rent dissipation. Rent dissipation follows as multiple firms compete for migratory oil in common oil pools. Unitization is the obvious private contractual solution to rent dissipation. The authors argue that, despite large net gains from unitization, imperfect information and information asymmetries among the negotiating parties regarding lease values prevents consensus on unit shares. As a result, contracts are often not completed or only fragmented units are completed. 9 references, 1 figure, 4 tables.

油田单位化不完全信息合同失败租值消散