Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts
研究在无法执行排他性条款时，客户与多家风险中性公司谈判非排他性合同，道德风险导致市场均衡可能比排他性合同下更多配给，公共供给或竞争加剧可能推高私人市场价格。
We consider a common agency context where socially desired exclusive dealing clauses cannot be enforced. Customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision. Outcomes of a class of Markov equilibria are characterized by a corresponding notion of constrained efficiency. These may involve more rationing than in a context of exclusive contracts. Increases in public provision or competition can result in increased prices on the private market, owing to an induced reduction in customer effort.