Wealth Constraints and Option Contracts in Models with Sequential Investments
研究两方序贯投资项目中，财富约束方如何通过期权合约与贷款安排实现最优投资，并比较内部融资与外部融资的差异。
Summary The paper investigates a model where two parties A and B invest sequentially in a joint project (an asset). Investments and the asset value are nonverifiable, and A is wealth constrained so that an initial outlay must be financed by either agent B (insider financing) or an external investor, a bank C (outsider financing). We show that an option contract in combination with a loan arrangement facilitates first best investments and any arbitrary distribution of surplus if renegotiation is infeasible. Moreover, the optimal strike price of the option is shown to dier across financing modes. If renegotiation is admitted, we identify conditions under which the first best can still be attained. Then, either B-financing or C-financing may be strictly preferable, and a combination of insider and outsider financing may be strictly optimal.