Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution
展示了如何实现拉姆齐政策（承诺下的最优财政与货币政策）的时间一致性，要求政府为继任者留下特定期限结构的债务，使意外通胀的边际收益与边际成本相等。
This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy – the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment – can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying policies with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our resuklts with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).