A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence
研究了一个序贯决策的公共池资源博弈，发现参数变化影响理论均衡但实验室行为变化不大，且策略无关参数也会影响行为，对制定防止可再生资源过度开采的政策有参考价值。
Abstract We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.