History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
分析英国在印度建立的殖民土地税收制度，发现历史上将土地所有权赋予地主的地区，在独立后农业投资和生产率显著低于赋予耕种者的地区，且健康和教育投资也更低，这些差异源于历史制度导致的政策选择差异。
We analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices.