Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider-Outsider Approach
提出一个理论，解释为何失业者（外部人）即使愿意接受低于在职者（内部人）的工资，也无法或不愿找到工作。外部人不敢压价，因为内部人会撤回合作并骚扰他们，降低其生产率并提高保留工资，从而产生劳动力流动成本，内部人借此设定工资，导致非自愿失业。
The authors present a theory of involuntary unemployment which explains why the unemployed workers ("outsiders" ) are unable or unwilling to find jobs even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers ("in siders"). The outsiders do not underbid the insiders since, were the y to do so, the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them, making their work unpleasant with harassment, and thereby reducing the prod uctivity and increasing the reservation wages of the underbidders. Th e resulting labor-turnover costs create economic rent which the insid ers tap in wage setting and, as a result, involuntary unemployment ma y arise. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.