Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment
研究企业观察到但工人观察不到劳动边际产品时，最优长期契约的形式，并证明信息不对称导致失业高于公开信息或现货市场情形，尤其当边际产品高于保留工资时仍可能失业。
This paper considers a firm whose marginal (revenue) product of labor is a random variable. We derive the form of an optimal long-term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor's marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers. We show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor's marginal product is public, or where employment is determined in spot markets. In particular, unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage.