The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment
评论了Comanor和Frech关于制造商利用产品差异化优势实施独家经销的模型，指出其未充分考虑经销商理性约束，修正后得出相反结论：独家经销仅在制造商降低批发价时才会被接受，且更可能出现在产品差异化较弱时。
In a recent paper, Comanor and Frech (1985, CF) claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price. The two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing. CF also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong. CF's analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality. Doing so within CF's model, I reach opposite conclusions. Exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers. Relative to nonexclusive dealing, price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other. Moreover, exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak.