Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
研究美国姐妹会成员招募过程的历史与组织，发现其集中匹配程序存在不稳定性，激励参与者策略性行为，并分析这种行为如何影响匹配系统的持久性与结果稳定性。
The history and organization of the membership recruitment process of American sororities is studied. Like entry-level labor markets studied previously, this process experienced failures that led to the adaptation of a centralized matching procedure in which a matching is determined on the basis of preference lists submitted by the agents. Analysis of the rules of the match and of preference lists from twenty-one matches reveals an unstable matching procedure that gives agents incentives to behave strategically. The analysis also shows how the agents act on these incentives and how the resulting strategic behavior has contributed to the longevity of the matching system and to the stability of the resulting matches. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.