Regulating Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Access in Medical Devices
研究了产品准入与质量信息要求对寡头均衡和消费者福利的影响，利用欧美医疗器械监管差异，发现美国更严格的测试要求能带来有价值的学习，而欧盟可从更多测试中获益。
We study the impact of regulating product entry and quality information requirements on an oligopoly equilibrium and consumer welfare. Product testing can reduce consumer uncertainty, but also increase entry costs and delay entry. Using variation between EU and US medical device regulations, we document patterns consistent with valuable learning from more stringent US requirements. To derive welfare implications, we pair the data with a model of supply, demand, and testing regulation. US policy is indistinguishable from the policy that maximizes total surplus in our estimated model, while the European Union could benefit from more testing. “Post-market surveillance” could further increase surplus.