Does Compensation Structure Alleviate Personal CEO Risks?
研究CEO薪酬结构（工资、奖金、期权、限制性股票）如何受其个人风险（薪酬实际价值、股权风险、持股组合价值及delta）影响，发现工资部分能降低多项个人风险，且不同薪酬成分与风险的关系存在非线性差异。
Abstract: Are CEO compensation packages designed to alleviate some of the personal risks that they bear? We employ a unified framework to test the relationship between the four major components of executive pay; salary, bonuses, option grants and restricted stock grants, and four factors that increase CEOs’ personal risks; the real value of their pay, the riskiness of firm equity, the value of their equity portfolios, and the delta of these equity holdings. We show that personal risks that CEOs face have significant effects on the design of their compensation contracts. Our results suggest that the portion of salary compensation decreases many of the personal risks that they face. There are intriguing differences between salary and bonuses on one hand, and option and restricted stock grants on the other. As predicted, we find that the delta of CEOs’ equity portfolios have strong nonlinear relationships with the different forms of compensation; especially with option grants.