Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation
指出，政府任命一个偏好不同的央行行长并不能解决货币政策的可信度问题，因为这种委托是自由裁量且无成本的；引入重新任命成本虽能改善次优结果，但会损害最优政策的可信度。
While optimal monetary policy is subject to a credibility problem, it is often argued that the government should appoint a central banker whose incentives differ from the government's. The author argues, however, that such delegation does not overcome credibility problems given that delegation is discretionary and without costs. 'Reappointment costs' of delegation are shown to improve suboptimal outcomes but credibility of optimal monetary policy turns out be worsened. At best, delegation therefore has no effects on credibility, but only if reappointment has no costs. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.