The Advertising Mix for a Search Good
将说服博弈扩展到广告经济学，研究企业如何选择广告内容（质量、价格、水平匹配信息）的均衡策略，发现低质量企业需提供更多信息，且随消费者访问成本变化，广告组合中先披露质量信息，再添加价格和水平信息。
We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower-quality firms need to provide more information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix. Some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.