Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?
研究保险市场中的道德风险问题，发现家庭和朋友间的互助在信息不对称时会挤出市场保险并造成损害，但在能相互监督时则有益，强调了同伴监督机制缓解道德风险的重要性。
We examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard. When market insurance is provided, supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends (unobservable to market insurers) will occur. When nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers, the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional Alternatively, when nonmarket insurers can observe each other's effort perfectly, mutual assistance is beneficial These results point to the potential importance of peer-monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard.