Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan
探讨在同时存在逆向选择和道德风险的团队中，委托人是否应监控个人产出。研究发现，当团队成员风险厌恶时，监控能带来收益，修正了McAfee和McMillan的结论。
In a team subject to adverse selection and moral hazard, R. P. McAfee and J. MacMillan (1991) found, surprisingly, that, under certain conditions, the outcome is unaffected whether the principal observes only total output or whether the principal can observe each person's individual contribution to the production of the output. This leads McAfee and MacMillan to conclude that the purpose of monitoring is to discipline the monitor. However, when team members are risk averse, the principal can benefit by monitoring. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.