Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities
通过实验研究排他性合同，发现买方沟通时歧视性要约提高排他可能性，无歧视时沟通降低排他可能性，且沟通会诱导更慷慨或分而治之的要约。
This paper reports the results of an experiment on exclusive contracts. We replicate the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000). Our findings are as follows. First, when the buyers can communicate, discrimination raises the likelihood of exclusion. Second, when the incumbent seller is unable to discriminate and must make the same offers to the buyers, communication reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Communication also induces more generous offers when the seller cannot discriminate, and divide-and-conquer offers when the seller can discriminate. Third, when communication is allowed, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion.