Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcments
研究美联储在公布未来政策信息时面临的困境，由于希望操纵预期并追求时间不一致政策，美联储无法精确可信地透露目标，只能通过廉价谈话机制给出不精确的范围。
This paper examines the problem faced by the Federal Reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies. Because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time-inconsistent policy, the Fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly. It can, however, communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel: making announcements that are imprecise, and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.