Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
研究人们通过炫耀性消费来显示财富、追求社会地位时，凡勃伦效应产生的条件。当偏好不满足单交叉性质时，奢侈品虽无内在优势却能高价出售并获利，文章还探讨了影响因素和政策含义。
The authors examine conditions under which 'Veblen effects' arise from the desire to achieve social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous consumption. While Veblen effects cannot ordinarily arise when preferences satisfy a 'single-crossing property, ' they may emerge when this property fails. In that case, 'budget' brands are priced at marginal cost, while 'luxury' brands, though not intrinsically superior, are sold at higher prices to consumers seeking to advertise wealth. Luxury brands earn strictly positive profits under conditions that would, with standard formulations of preferences, yield marginal-cost pricing. The authors explore factors that induce Veblen effects and they investigate policy implications. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.