Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of Network Externalities
研究了在没有网络外部性的情况下，企业生产兼容组件与不兼容系统的激励差异，发现兼容性会提高价格和利润，但两种体制下的总剩余高低不确定，且都过度提供多样性。
The author compares the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of "systems" composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers. He shows that, even in the absence of positive consumption externalities (" network" externalities), prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility. Equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime. Both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus-maximizing solution. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.