Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels
分析研发卡特尔和研究合资企业如何影响进行古诺或伯川德竞争的企业，发现竞争性研发合资企业会降低技术进步水平并提高价格，而合作决策的研发合资企业则能最大化消费者与生产者剩余。
The authors analyze the effects of R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on firms that engage in either Cournot or Bertrand competition in their product market. Research efforts, which precede production, are directed to reducing unit cost and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. It is shown that creating a competitive research joint venture reduces the equilibrium level of technological improvement and increases equilibrium prices compared to when firms conduct R&D independently. A research joint venture that cooperates in its R&D decisions yields the highest consumer plus producer surplus under Cournot competition and, in most cases, under Bertrand competition. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.