Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment
构建了一个模型，其中管理层自愿选择债务来约束自己未来的帝国建设行为，推导出动态一致的资本结构，并分析了债务与股利政策的协调、债务水平、频率和期限结构等含义。
This paper develops a model in which managers voluntarily choose debt to credibly constrain their own future empire-building. Dynamically consistent capital structure is derived as the optimal response in each period of partially entrenched managers trading off empire-building ambitions with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. A policy of capital structure coordinated with dividends follows naturally, as do implications for the level, frequency, and maturity structure of debt as a function of outside investment opportunities. Additionally, the model yields new testable implications for security design, and changes in debt and empire-building over managerial careers. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.