Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
构建了双边市场中平台竞争的模型，分析了不同治理结构（利润最大化平台与非营利联合体）下价格分配和用户剩余的決定因素，并与一体化垄断者和拉姆齐规划者的结果进行比较。
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board ”. Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner. 1